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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
to defendant's "silence" when it was not shown he knew, or could reasonably
have been expected to know, of the facts from which the plaintiff's cause of
action grew. By the very nature of his profession a physician must be held
to a high degree of care, but the law cannot consider him as superhuman
and omnipotent. Public policy considerations justifiably dictate many decis-
ions, but care must be exercised lest logic suffer to an unreasonable degree.
SHANNON MAHONEY.
SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM - EFFECT OF FAILURE TO ASSERT OR CLAIM
- IDENTITY OF PARTIES UNDER COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM RULE. - Plain-
tiff brought an action against defendant as the administratrix of an estate.
Previously, defendant, in her personal capacity, had recovered a judgment
against plaintiff for injuries arising out of the same incident. Defendant con-
tended that her recovery of a judgment was res judicata to the plaintiff's
claim under Rule 97 (a) of the Texas Rules.of Civil Procedure which pro-
vides for compulsory counterclaims.1 The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas
held that the compulsory counterclaim rile did not apply since the defendant
had sued as an individual and the plaintiff had no cause of action against
her, while in this action she was sued in her capacity as administratrix with
the result that the plaintiff was not bringing his action against her, but
against the estate - a different party - and the issue was not res judicata as
contended. Robertson v. Estate of Melton, 306 S.W.2d 811 (Texas 1957).
A counterclaim is a cause of action in itself and seeks affirmative relief,
while a defense merely defeats the plaintiff's claim.2. It meets the plaintiff's
claim by opposing to it a demand on the part of the defendant to the end
that a complete determination of the right to and amount of recovery may
be had in the same action. It represents the defendant's right to have the
claims of the parties counterbalanced in whole or in part, judgment to be
entered for the excess, if.any.-"
Where the parties ale not the same in both actions, it has been held that
the failure to assert a counterclaim under Federal Rule 13 (a)4 in the prior
action did not preclude assertion of the claim in a separate and subsequent
action. In a case similar to the principal case, the plaintiff, as administrator,
brought an action to secover for the wrongful death of his intestate alleged to
have been caused by the negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff in a later
action sought to recover as representative of the beneficiaries, where in the
former action he had been acting on behalf of the creditors. The court point-
ed out that for the purpose of res judicata the administrator in acting on
behalf of the beneficiaries was not, under the death statute, the same person
1. Texas Rule 97 (a) is substantially the same as Rule 13 (a) of the North Dakota
Rules of Civil Procedure which provides: "COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS. A plead-
ing shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the
pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurance
that is the subiect matter of the opposing parties' claim and does not renuire for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction,
except that such a claim need not be so stated ifiat the time the action was commenced
the claim was the subject of another pending action."
2. Secor v. Siver, 165 Iowa 673, 146 N.W. 845 (1914).
3. Olsen v. McMaken,& Pentzien, 139 Neb. 506, 297 N.\V. 830 (1941).




as when he represented the creditors.? The rule of civil procedure which pro-
vides for compulsory counterclaims contemplates situations where the pri-
mary parties - the cross-plaintiff and at least one cross-defendant - are be-
fore the court as parties to an action which arises out of the same "transac-
tion or occurrance".J
The rnle as stated in the cited cases appears to be that!the':demands must
be mutual, between the same parties, and in the same capacitj. A judgment
against one as an individual does not bind him as executor, nor does one
against him as executor bind him as an individual in a subsequent action,
although, the issue is identical and the decision in the first actioi:'was upon
its merits.
7
While actions by ; he -same individual in different capacities, 'ire treated as
actions brought formally in dilferent capacities, but actually for the ultimate
benefit of the same Ierson, are by the same person.8 This view appears to be
a minority with the great weight of authority supporting the theory that the
parties must also be aceting in the same capacity.
ALAN WARCUP.
TRIAL- PREJUDICIAL ERnot -- DISCLOSURE O.F DEFENDANT'S LIABILITY IN-
SURANCE.- In a damage suit resulting from an automobile accident, plaintiff
was asked by his attorney who took the statement of facts following the ac-
cident. Plaintiff answered that he was unaware of the person's name, but
thought he was an insurance man. Defendant's motion for a mistrial was
overruled, but the court admonished the jury not to consider the matter of
insurance. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the reference to in-
surance was voluntary and not responsive and the prompt admonition to the
jury removed any prejudicial effect. Ragon v. Day, 306 S.W.2d 687 (Ark.
1957).
A majority of the courts, bold that in an action for personal injury or
death, the disclosure of the fact that the defendant is protected by liability
insurance is inadmissible and ground for mistrial. 2 Such evidence is inad-
missible because it does not bear on the issue of negligence and tends to
5. Campbell v. Aahler, 320 Mass. 475, 70 N.E.2d 302 (1946). See also In re
Kenin's Estate, 346 Pa. 1:27, 29 A.2d 495 (1942), where the court held that in an action
by an individual, a claim against hirn as executor or administrator cannot be pleaded as
a set-off.
6. . Stevenson v. Reid, 96 A.2d 268 (Mon. Ct. of App. for D.C. 1953); Ruzicka v.
"Rager, 305 N.Y. 191, 111 N.E.2d 878 (1953); Rose v. Motes, 220 S.W.2d 734 (Tex.
Civ App. 1949). See Hoffman v. Stuart, 188 Va. 785, 51 S.E.2d 239 (1949).
7. First Nat'l Bank i. Shuler, 153 N.Y. 163, 47 N.E. 262 (1897).
8. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611 (1925); In re Parks
Estate, 166 Iowa 403, 147 N.W. 850 (1914). See Clark, Code Pleading, p. 479 n.157
(2nd ed. 1947). But see Newton v. Mitchell, 42 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1949).
1. See, e.g., Garee v. MeDonell, 116 F.2d 78 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313
U.S. 561 (1941); Johnson v. Stotts, 344 Il. App. 614, 101 N.E.2d 880 (1951);
Carls Markets v. Meyer, 69 So.2d -89, (Fla. 1953); 21, Appleman, Insurance Law &
Practice § 12832 (1947). But see Crum, Counterclaims and Third-Party Practice, 39 N.
Dak. L. Rev. 7, 24 (1958) as to joining an insurance company as an outright code-
fendant.
2. See Beardsley, v. Ewing, 40 N.D. 373, 168 N.W. 791 (1918). ("The trial
judge, who has the advantage of the atmosphere of the trial can best determine the ex-
tent of the threatened prejudice, and can take precautionary. measures . . . even to the
extent of granting a new trial.")
1958]
